Reading List

Fiction
  • “Monkey Business: Swinging Through the Wall Street Jungle” – Rolfe, John
  • “The Grapes of Wrath” – John Steinbeck
  • “Syrup” – Barry Maxx
Finance & Economics
  • “Fooled by Randomness” – Taleb, Nassim
  • “Forecast” – Buchanan, Mark
  • “A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation” – Bookstaber, Richard
  • “The Predators’ Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and the Rise of the Junk Bond Raiders” – Bruck, Connie
  • “Den of Thieves” – Stewart, James

Science Fiction

  • “Homecoming” – Ray Bradbury

Popular Science

  • “Fractal Geometry of Nature” – Mandelbrot, Benoit
  • “Ubiquity” – Buchanan, Mark
  • “Critical Mass” – Ball, Philip
  • “Why Most Things Fail” – Ormerod, Paul

Philosophy

  • “The Last Messiah” – Peter Zapffe
  • “Nihil Unbound” – Ray Brassier
  • “Conspiracy against the Human Race” – Thomas Ligotti

Other

  • “Sixteen Satires” – Juvenal
  • “How to Win Friends and Influence People” – Carnegie, Dale

Books

Economics and Finance

Title

Author

Score/10

Remarks

Barbarians at the Gate Burrough, Bryan 6
The Black Swan: the Impact of the Highly Improbable Taleb, Nassim 9
Options: Plain & Simple Jordan, Lenny
Inventing Money: The Story of LTCM Dunbar, Nicholas 7
Value Investing: From Graham to Buffet and Beyond Greenwald, Bruce 8
Money Mavericks: Confessions of a Hedge Fund Manager Kroijer, Lars 8

Memoirs

Title

Author Score/10 Remarks

Wind, Sand and Stars

Saint-Exupery, A.

7

Liar’s Poker Lewis, Michael

10

Wine

Title Author Score/10 Remarks
The World Atlas of Wine Johnson, Hugh 8
Wine Science Goode, Jamie 8

Fiction

Title Author Score/10 Remarks
The Fate of a Man Sholokhov, Mikhail 10
The Financier Dreiser, Theodore 7

David Stockman on NATO’s Eastward Expansion

I have recently come across a well-written article on NATO’s eastward expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The article is written by David Stockman, former Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan, and I found his contrarian tone rather surprising, as few US observers openly recognised the flaws in NATO’s  geopolitical manoeuvres with respect to Russia. Here are some of the excerpts which I found especially zesty.

When the needlessly prolonged and unnecessarily friction-filled Cold War ended in 1991, there occurred an historic opportunity to reclaim the non-interventionist wisdom of America’s republican fathers and dismantle the nation’s vast and costly war machine—and most especially it far-flung system of military bases and alliances. The chance had come to unwind NATO, nullify the treaties and dismantle its vast force structure. Sadly, the Republican party by then had been fatally afflicted with the neo-con disease and was on the prowl for cheap triumphalist projects anywhere on the planet that needed trousers, ballot boxes and Coca-Cola.

David Stockman also refers to this spring’s article in the Washington Post:

Even after the U.S.S.R. ceased to exist…. the United States insisted on treating Russia as the loser….President Bill Clinton supported NATO’s bombing of Serbia without U.N. Security Council approval and the expansion of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries.  Those moves seemed to violate the understanding that the United States would not take advantage of the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe.

Ambassador Matlock also notes that Putin was not always postured as the “thug” and aggressor of Speaker Boehner’s schoolyard imagination:Vladi­mir Putin was elected in 2000 and initially followed a pro-Western orientation. When terrorists attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, he was the first foreign leader to call and offer support. He cooperated with the United States when it invaded Afghanistan, and he voluntarily removed Russian bases from Cuba and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.

Then he pulls no punches, pinning the blame for our current asinine confrontation with Putin exactly where it belongs:

What did he get in return? Some meaningless praise from President George W. Bush, who then delivered the diplomatic equivalent of swift kicks to the groin: further expansion of NATO in the Baltics and the Balkans, and plans for American bases there; withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; invasion of Iraq without U.N. Security Council approval; overt participation in the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan; and then, probing some of the firmest red lines any Russian leader would draw, talk of taking Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Americans, heritors of the Monroe Doctrine, should have understood that Russia would be hypersensitive to foreign-dominated military alliances approaching or touching its borders.

The  complete article could be found on David Stockman’s official website.

Why Use Log Returns?

Excellent summary on why log natural returns are used in favour of raw returns. Original is found here.

A reader recently asked an important question, one which often puzzles those new to quantitative finance (especially those coming from technical analysis, which relies upon price pattern analysis):

Why use the logarithm of returns, rather than price or raw returns?

The answer is several fold, each of whose individual importance varies by problem domain.

Begin by defining a return: r_i at time i, where p_i is the price at time i and j \equiv (i - 1):

r_i = \frac{p_i - p_j}{ p_j }

Benefit of using returns, versus prices, is normalization: measuring all variables in a comparable metric, thus enabling evaluation of analytic relationships amongst two or more variables despite originating from price series of unequal values. This is a requirement for many multidimensional statistical analysis and machine learning techniques. For example, interpreting an equity covariance matrix is made sane when the variables are both measured in percentage.

Several benefits of using log returns, both theoretic and algorithmic.

First, log-normality: if we assume that prices are distributed log normally (which, in practice, may or may not be true for any given price series), then log(1 + r_i) is conveniently normally distributed, because:

1 + r_i = \frac{p_i}{p_j} = \exp^{\log(\frac{p_i}{p_j})}

This is handy given much of classic statistics presumes normality.

Second, approximate raw-log equality: when returns are very small (common for trades with short holding durations), the following approximation ensures they are close in value to raw returns:

\log(1 + r) \approx r , r \ll 1

Third, time-additivity: consider an ordered sequence of n trades. A statistic frequently calculated from this sequence is the compounding return, which is the running return of this sequence of trades over time:

\displaystyle (1 + r_1)(1 + r_2)  \cdots (1 + r_n) = \prod_i (1+r_i)

This formula is fairly unpleasant, as probability theory reminds us the product of normally-distributed variables is not normal. Instead, the sum of normally-distributed variables is normal (important technicality: only when all variables are uncorrelated), which is useful when we recall the following logarithmic identity:

\log(1 + r_i) = log(\frac{p_i}{p_j}) = \log(p_i) - log(p_j)

Thus, compounding returns are normally distributed. Finally, this identity leads us to a pleasant algorithmic benefit; a simple formula for calculating compound returns:

\displaystyle \sum_i \log(1+r_i) = \log(1 + r_1) + \log(1 + r_2)  + \cdots + \log(1 + r_n) = \log(p_n) - \log(p_0)

Thus, the compound return over n periods is merely the difference in log between initial and final periods. In terms of algorithmic complexity, this simplification reduces O(n) multiplications to O(1) additions. This is a huge win for moderate to large n. Further, this sum is useful for cases in which returns diverge from normal, as the central limit theorem reminds us that the sample average of this sum will converge to normality (presuming finite first and second moments).

Fourth, mathematical ease: from calculus, we are reminded (ignoring the constant of integration):

e^x = \int e^x dx = \frac{d}{dx} e^x = e^x

This identity is tremendously useful, as much of financial mathematics is built upon continuous time stochastic processes which rely heavily upon integration and differentiation.

Fifth, numerical stability: addition of small numbers is numerically safe, while multiplying small numbers is not as it is subject to arithmetic underflow. For many interesting problems, this is a serious potential problem. To solve this, either the algorithm must be modified to be numerically robust or it can be transformed into a numerically safe summation via logs.

As suggested by John Hall, there are downsides to using log returns. Here are two recent papers to consider (along with their references):

The New Yorker: Blowing up (22 April, 2002)

An easy-to-follow article from The New Yorker for those wanting to know more about Nassim Taleb and how he ran his hedge fund Empirica.

Link

Interesting Out-takes:

George Soro’s son on his father:

The truest thing about Soros seemed to be what his son Robert had once said: “My father will sit down and give you theories to explain why he does this or that. But I remember seeing it as a kid and thinking, Jesus Christ, at least half of this is bullshit. I mean, you know the reason he changes his position on the market or whatever is because his back starts killing him. It has nothing to do with reason. He literally goes into a spasm, and it’s this early warning sign.”

Eugene Fama and the Bell Curve:

…Do the ups and downs of the market follow a bell curve? The economist Eugene Fama once studied stock prices and pointed out that if they followed a normal distribution you’d expect a really big jump, what he specified as a movement five standard deviations from the mean, once every seven thousand years. In fact, jumps of that magnitude happen in the stock market every three or four years, because investors don’t behave with any kind of statistical orderliness.